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Criminal Law and Justice System Practices
as Racist, White, and Racialized
Kathleen Daly*
L Race and Gender Together: A Prologue
For close to a decade I have been engaged in research on the ways that
gender and race structure the sentencing process in the New Haven felony
court.' In the early phase of the research, I was particularly interested in
how gender structured the court's response to those accused. In time, that
question evolved to one that asked how the court's response to accused men
and women, most of whom lived at society's margins, varied by race and
ethnicity. Today it is difficult for me to think about race without also having
in mind black, white, and latino masculinities. It is also difficult to write a
sentence about race differences without recalling gender differences within
racial and ethnic groups. As we discuss race and class in the criminal justice
system, let us not forget that both have a gendered face.
In fact, I want to put the case more strongly. While the story of
crime and the justice system is typically one of the disproportionate
presence of racial and ethnic minority group members among those
arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated, the gender disproportionalities are
as great or greater. Women account for 11% of those arrested for the
FBI's violent index offenses,2 13% of those convicted in state felony
* Visiting Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan. I am grateful
to Deborah Stephens for her comments on an earlier draft.
1. See KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT (1994) [hereinafter
DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT]; Kathleen Daly, Gender and Punishment Dis-
parity, in INEQUALITY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 117 (George S. Bridges & Martha A.
Myers eds., 1994); Kathleen Daly, Women's Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories
of Lawbreaking and Problems of Representation, 2 REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 11 (1992).
2. SOURCEBOOKOF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, at442 (Timothy J. Flanagan
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992) (1990 data). The violent index offenses are murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery. The female share of violent
index arrests has remained constant at about 10% for the past three decades. See Darrell
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courts,3 5% of the prisoners in the United States,4 and 1 % of those under
penalty of death.' These statistics should give us pause in making claims
about how relations of power operate in the broader society and in the
criminal justice system. Race and age operate as we might expect: Members
of a racial minority group (blacks) and the young are disproportionately
represented in arrest, court, and prison populations.' But members of the
socially subordinate gender group (women) are disproportionately less likely
to be represented in arrest, court, and prison populations. Although the
general expectations of power-based theories hold true within gender
groups-that is, 60 % of women and men imprisoned are members of racial
minority groupsT-such power-based theories cannot explain the dispropor-
tionate presence of men under formal criminal justice control. The
demography of crime and justice poses challenges for both feminist and
nonfeminist theories of social control, crime, and justice. Feminist theorists
have yet to explain why, if men have more power than women, men are at
greater risk to be under criminal justice control Nonfeminist theorists
need to be mindful of the gendered dimensions to any claim concerning those
at risk to be criminalized.
Steffensmeier &Emilie Allan, Gender, Age, and Crime, in CRIMINOLOGY 107 (Joseph Sheley
ed., 1991).
3. PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF
FELONS CONVICTED IN STATE COURTS 4 (1990) (1988 data).
4. ALLEN BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES,
1991, at 3 (1993) (1991 data).
5. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, supra note 2, at 705.
6. The black share of violent index arrests is 45%. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991, supra note 2, at 444. Black defendants account for 41% of those
convicted in state felony courts. LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 3, at 4. The racial
composition of those imprisoned is 46% black, 35% white, 17% Latino, and 2% other
(largely Native American and Asian). BECK ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
7. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHANIE MINOR-HARPER, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON 2 (1991) (1985 data). The composition of female prisoners is
40% white, 46% black, 12% Hispanic, and 2% other. For male prisoners, it is 40% white,
45% black, 13% Hispanic, and 2% other.
8. An obvious explanation for why men are at a greater risk of being under criminal
justice control, but one that is often missing in the power-based theories, is that because
women are subject to heightened forms of informal social control via relations to men and
children, they are less likely to be subject to formal social controls. See FRANCES M.
HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN AND CRIME 163-95 (1985).
RACIST, WHITE, AND RA CIALIZED
If crime and justice system policies in the United States are to move
from a largely penalizing, criminalizing, and warehousing model to a more
humane system that envisions welfare, restoration, and reintegration as its
principles, then we must radically reconfigure conceptions of manhood and
masculinity. That could be done by paying closer attention to the circum-
stances and conditions in women's lives that, for reasons that have yet to be
fully appreciated or explained, render women more law-abiding than men
and less likely to harm others. While class and race relations are often
nominated as the major structural conditions that facilitate pathways to
lawbreaking and that target certain groups for state control, we would do
well to focus our attention also on the criminalizing consequences of trying
to be "a man."
1. Understanding Race in the Justice System:
A Modest Beginning
My initial plan for this Article was to re-examine the New Haven
felony court materials from a "race-first," rather than "gender-first," lens.
In saying this, I am aware of arguments by black and multi-ethnic feminist
and critical race scholars of the need to conceptualize race, gender, and class
together.9 That is the goal. Yet it is a formidable goal: we may be able to
imagine the simultaneous expression of multiple social relations, but to
transform those imagined terms into an explanation of the patterning of
social phenomena is a different matter. While it is possible to describe the
subjectivity of individuals within a nexus of multiple relations, it is more
difficult to describe patterned subjectivities and group-based behavior. 10
A large body of empirical and legal literature exists on race relations
and the criminal justice system, but my review of that literature suggests that
socio-legal scholars lack an adequate way to conceptualize how race operates
in criminal law and justice system practices. For example, in the sociologi-
cal literature on racial disparities in criminal court processes, scholars
conceptualize the impact of race on court outcomes as being consistent (or
9. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
10. In another article, I trace the emergence of the class-race-gender construct and
suggest how it can change legal and social science inquiry. See Kathleen Daly, Class-Race-
Gender: Sloganeering in Search ofMeaning, Soc. JUST., Spring-Summer 1993, at 56. I have
come to think that the tools of social science are ill-equipped to trace the expression and
impact of multiple social relations. On the other hand, narrative modes of inquiry, which are
more amendable to this project, are ill-equipped to make generalizations, even of a local sort.
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inconsistent) with the tenets of two popular power-based theories, labeling
and conflict." Labeling theory suggests that those with more power or
resources are in a better position to resist a criminal label, whereas conflict
theory suggests that the larger societal power structures operate in ways that
overcriminalize and control members of disadvantaged groups. My criticism
of these theories lies not with their initial premises. That is, we should
expect to see unequal power relations reproduced in social institutions in
ways that disadvantage the socially and economically marginalized. 12
Rather, I am critical of the constraints that these theories impose on how
race is theorized to work in criminal justice practices, particularly the
dominant focus on problems of "equal treatment." Moreover, these theories
are unable to deal with a heterogeneous set of findings from court studies:
from no apparent "race effects" to strong effects, from variation in outcomes
depending on how the sentencing outcome is operationalized to variation
depending on urban-suburban-rural court context, geographical location, and
time frame.' 3 It is precisely the heterogeneity of empirical findings, the
different directions that race and ethnicity take in justice system practices,
that may provide a more fruitful focus. Meanwhile, researchers continue to
debate whether the criminal justice system is racist, with a dichotomous form
of thinking that often generates more heat than light.'4
11. For recent examples, see Margaret Farnworth et al., Ethnic, Racial, and Minority
Disparity in Felony Court Processing, in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54 (Michael J. Lynch
& E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991); Kimberly L. Kempf & Roy L. Austin, Older and More
Recent Evidence on RacialDiscrimination in Sentencing, 2 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
29 (1986).
12. But as I stated earlier, theoretical approaches that expect to see unequal power
relations reproduced in social institutions cannot explain why women, as a socially
subordinate group in relation to men, are less likely to be subject to criminal justice controls.
Moreover, and equally counterfactual, close to one-half of statistical studies show that women
are favored in sentencing. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at
13. My research suggests that these statistical results are misleading because they have not
effectively controlled for the severity of the crime and the defendant's prior record.
13. For my review of the sociological literature on racial disparities, see infra notes 43-
55 and accompanying text.
14. See WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1987); William Wilbanks, The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System, in RACISM,
EMPIRICISM, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Brian D. MacLean & Dragan Milovanovic eds.,
1990).
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Lacking a conceptual scheme to compare different assumptions that
scholars make about race, which in turn guide how scholars frame research
and interpret findings, I decided to construct such a scheme. I borrow from
a typology that Carol Smart devised to describe feminist analyses of gender
and law. 5 Working from gender to race was a comfortable and familiar
starting point for me; it reveals an intellectual biography that was schooled
in theories of class and gender. 6
Smart identified three phases of critique and development: law as
sexist, male, and gendered.' 7 Applying this typology to race and the
criminal justice system, we can identify these phases: criminal law and
justice system practices as racist, white, and racialized. This framework
helps to clarify how law and social science, legal and social science scholars,
and citizens comprehend and disagree as to how race matters or ought to
matter. It may also offer a way to think more imaginatively about race and
the criminal justice system.
This Article is organized in eight parts. In Parts I and II, I have noted
several problems in conceptualizing "race" in the criminal justice system.
Part III continues in that vein by focusing on my role as a white person in
the race discussion and the need for research on routine racism. In Part IV,
I shift to Smart's arguments concerning three phases of analyzing gender and
law. Part V reviews the research literature on race and criminal courts, and
Part VI briefly considers gender-race analogies and inter-relationships. I
then apply Smart's gender framework to race in Part VII by presenting three
approaches to conceptualizing race in criminal law and justice system
practices, the strengths and weaknesses of each, and examples of each in
action. I conclude by noting the strategic value of each approach as a way
for participants to engage one another-rather than talk past each other-in
debate.
III. Caveats, Questions, and Theoretical Grounding
Key issues need to be addressed about defining race, my role as a
white woman in the race discussion, the impact of black feminist and critical
15. See Carol Smart, The Woman of Legal Discourse, 1 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 29
(1992).
16. For a discussion of my role as a white woman in the race discussion, see infra note
22 and accompanying text.
17. Smart, supra note 15, at 30.
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race theories on my thinking, and a language for and attention to routine
racism.
First, what is meant by race or racial difference? As anthropologists
have shown, the concept of race as applied to human populations is not
meaningful in a biological sense. Rather, the referent is to social categories
and socially constructed identities. 8 Neither "whiteness" nor "blackness"
can be taken for granted. 9 And, as others suggest, the black-white dualism
thwarts an understanding of the broader picture of racial and ethnic
relations-for example, the relational histories of Latinos and Latinas, Native
Americans, African-Americans, and Asian-Americans to each other in the
United States.2' My examples will draw from white-black relations and
research that takes a dichotomous view of criminal justice practices, although
I am aware of the problems with this view.2
Second, some may wonder what a white girl is doing talking about
race. I am suspicious when some men assume that they can speak authorita-
18. For a concise review of the meaning of race or racial difference, see Michael J.
Lynch & E. Britt Patterson, in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 5-6 (1991); and CORAMAE
RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 3-24 (1993). Mann proposes
that "minority group" may be a better term (rather than race or ethnicity) when discussing
diverse racial and ethnic groupings. Id. at 4-5.
19. On "whiteness," see generally RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE
MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE
WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE ANDTHE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
On "blackness," see generally Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie, Race, Ethnicity, and the Spatial
Dynamic: Toward a Realistic Study of Black Crime, Crime Victimization, and Criminal Justice
Processing of Blacks, Soc. JUST., Winter 1989, at 35; Stuart Hall, What is This "Black" in
Black Popular Culture?, in BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 21 (Gina Dent ed., 1992).
20. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA (1993); Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, Soc.
JUST., Spring-Summer 1993, at 22.
21. My reasons for drawing upon black-white relations are that the focus ofsocio-legal
research on crime and the criminal justice system has been on black-white relations; only
recently have scholars examined several minority groups. See MANN, supra note 18;
Kathleen Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice: Intersections of
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Family in Criminal Court Decisions, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 136
(1989); Farnworth et al., supra note 11; Marjorie S. Zatz et al., American Indians and
Criminal Justice: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations, in RACE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 100 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1991); Marjorie S. Zatz,
Pleas, Priors and Prison: Racial/Ethnic Differences in Sentencing, 14 SOC. SCi. RES. 169
(1985).
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tively about gender: they may not be able to recognize their gender loyalties
even as they proclaim a pro-feminist stance. The same suspicion applies to
me: Can I make reliable or reasonable claims about race when I am on the
dominant side of the relationship? I cannot conceptualize race and justice
system practices from the same types of experiences as scholars of color,
though I would not assume uniformity among that group either. In light of
the racial politics in the United States, I assume that there will be some
skepticism of what I have to say. But if I allowed that to prevent me from
speaking to the race issue, I would be capitulating to the convenience of
white silence. Although I opened my Article with a plea to think of race and
gender together, it is obvious that we must also think of class and race
together. In doing so, we can identify some of the problems that feminist
and critical race scholars may share in analyzing crime and justice system
practices.22
Third, the theorists who have guided me in recognizing the distinctive
elements and the multiple influences of class, gender, race, and other social
relations are feminists of color, especially black feminists, and some critical
race theorists. Through the work of Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, June
Jordan, Audre Lorde, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Deborah King,' I learned
about the intersecting influences of social relations in personal and political
life. The writings of Derrick Bell, Patricia Williams, Regina Austin,
Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda demonstrate, among other things, the
male- and white-centeredness of antidiscrimination law.2' These and other
22. I have benefited greatly from Regina Austin's discussion of the class-race location
of knowledge producers and targets of criminal justice control. See Regina Austin, "The
Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
1769 (1992).
23. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1990); BELL
HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); BELL HOOKS, YEARNING:
RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS (1990); JUNE JORDAN, ON CALL: POLITICAL
ESSAYS (1985); AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginal-
izing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989);
Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist
Ideology, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 42 (1988). Citations are selectively
taken from each author's larger body of work.
24. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS-DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 539 (1989); Austin, supra note 22; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
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scholars have crafted arguments about gender, race, and class in ways that
those in traditional social science, legal theory, and criminology may find
unfamiliar. That "unfamiliarity" fosters a continuing stubbornness by a
white-dominated establishment to understand minority group analyses and
experiences of race, crime, and justice system practices ."
Fourth, we lack an honest and open appraisal of how race and class
work in the criminal justice system. The reason in part is that we-that is,
everyone-do not know how to talk about racial and ethnic specificity
without engaging in racist imagery. We require a way to name and describe
differences that offend, that create interpersonal relations of domination, and
that ultimately reproduce structures of antagonism and prejudice. If all we
are able to say is "that is racist" or "that is not racist," we have not
accomplished much. Moreover, it is essential to name and describe the
routine ways that race works in the criminal justice system. Celebrated
cases, such as the police beating of Rodney King or the gang rape of the
Central Park jogger, may galvanize public and media attention. But they
also set people up to think, wrongly, that race works in dramatic ways. We
need to identify and document routine forms and sites of racism (or
racializing practices) in criminal law and justice system practices. While I
realize that it is not easy to document routine racism, my concern is that
celebrated cases should not stand alone in the public's imagination about
crime.
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Mari
Matsuda, Affirmative Action andLegal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988). Citations are selectively taken from each author's larger
body of work. For recent symposia on critical race theory, see Symposium: CriminalLaw,
Criminal Justice, and Race, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1725 (1993); Symposium on Race Conscious-
ness and Legal Scholarship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 945 (1992).
25. I should point out that while a substantial black, multi-ethnic, and critical race
theory scholarship exists, it has not yet been brought into criminology. For example, in an
analysis of "cultural literacy" in criminology, Gregg Barak gathered a list of reading material
from selected scholars that they thought was "essential for understanding the African-
American experience in relationship to crime, control, and justice." Gregg Barak, Cultural
Literacy and a Multicultural Inquiry into the Study of Crime and Justice, 2 J. CRIM. JUST.
EDUC. 173, 184 (1991). With a few exceptions, none of the works cited were by critical
race, black, or multi-ethnic feminist scholars. Id. at 184-86. Also, in a recent groundbreak-
ing book for criminology, the authors do not address critical race or black feminist theories.
See AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME CAUSATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION, AND CRIME PREVENTION (Anne T. Sulton ed., 1994). More bridging
across these literatures is needed.
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IV. A Typology of Feminist Analyses of Gender and Law
Smart identifies three phases in analyzing gender and law: law as
sexist, law as male, and law as gendered. 6 She suggests that while these
"levels of argument may be. .. deployed simultaneously," it is helpful to
distinguish them to see their "analytical promise. "I I review her argument
in some detail because I am indebted to it in sketching my race framework.
A. Law As Sexist
In the law-as-sexist phase, the focus is on how, by differentiating men
and women, law disadvantages women by allocating them fewer resources,
by judging them according to different standards, by denying them
opportunities, or by failing to recognize certain harms done to women.'
The term sexist is used to challenge law-as-usual, but apart from pointing out
objectional features of law and legal practices toward women, it lacks
analytical bite and may misconstrue the nature of the problem. Although
Smart does not disagree with the claim that "law is sexist," she notes several
unsatisfactory elements. The "law is sexist" claim assumes that a "corrective
could be made to a biased vision" and that this "corrective suggests that law
suffers from a problem of perception which can be put right such that all
legal subjects are treated equally. "29
Smart identifies two major problems with the law-as-sexist position.
First, differentiation and discrimination become synonymous terms: Women
are treated badly because they differ from men. One way out is to say that
women need to be judged by a female standard; however, Smart notes that
"if those women who set the standard are white and middle class .... we
26. See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
27. Smart, supra note 15, at 30. Readers familiar with feminist debates about
knowledge will see that the three phases can be linked to those in knowledge production:
positive/empiricist, standpoint, and poststructuralist. For elucidation of these questions, see
SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) [hereinafter HARDING, THE
SCIENCE QUESTION]; SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING
FROM WOMEN'S LIvES (1991) [hereinafter HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE?]; FEMIN-
ISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). This Article focuses on how race is
conceptualized in criminal law and justice system practices; while methodological and
epistemological questions cannot be separated from this conceptual scheme, I do not consider
them here in depth.
28. Smart, supra note 15, at 31.
29. Id.
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are left with an equally problematic legal system in which sexism is
apparently eradicated but other forms of oppression remain. "30 Second,
proponents may assume that it is possible to "override sexual difference as
if it were epiphenomenal rather than embedded in how we comprehend and
negotiate the social order."3' To eradicate discrimination would mean to
eradicate differentiation or to have culture without gender. That would be
hard to imagine, although several vaguely defined androgynies may be
possible.
B. Law As Male
Law-as-male begins with the observation that those making and
interpreting law are male, but moves beyond this observation by suggesting
that masculinity or male values need not be anchored to male bodies. Legal
ideals of objectivity and neutrality, though framed as universal values, are
revealed as masculine values." From the law-as-male perspective, the
failure of law is not in not applying "objective criteria" to women, but rather
in applying reputedly objective criteria that are actually masculine. Thus,
law-as-male proponents point out that "[t]o insist on equality, neutrality and
objectivity is ... to insist on being judged by the values of masculinity.""'
Smart's criticisms of the law-as-male position are threefold. First,
proponents tend to see coherence and unity in law, when in fact law is more
often contradictory. Second, proponents tend to assume "that men...
either benefit or are somehow celebrated in the rehearsal of values and
practices which claim universality while ... reflecting a partial position or
world view.""4 Third, arguments that give priority to a binary division,
such as male-female, ignore other differentiations; thus, divisions such as
class, race, and age become additive to the analysis.3"
30. Id.
31. Id. at 31-32.
32. Id. at 32. Many readers will immediately recognize that a good deal of feminist
legal theory has been working within this position.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 33. For a discussion of additivity as a problem for feminist theory, see
ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); Crenshaw, supra note 23; King, supra
note 23. It is revealing that while gender-first theorists have been dealing with the problem
of additivity and intersectionality for some time, race-first theorists have yet to do so. Black
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C. Law As Gendered
In the law-as-gendered phase, we can imagine legal processes
operating in varied and cross-cutting ways: "[T]here is no relentless
assumption that whatever [law] does exploits women and serves men. "36
Proponents assume that legal practices operate through a gendered, and thus
differentiated, discursive lens. Thus, one need not necessarily claim that a
practice is harmful to women because it is applied differently in relation to
men. Here, Smart offers the example of prisons: "[W]e can assess practices
like imprisonment without being forced to say that the problem of women's
prisons is that they are not like men's. "37 Moreover, Smart proposes that
in viewing the law as gendered, there need not be a fixed category or
empirical referent of Man and Woman. 8 These now are "gendered subject
position[s] ... [that are] not fixed by either biological, psychological or
social determinants to sex.,
39
With a law-as-gendered approach, scholars can analyze how "law
insists on a specific version of gender differentiation" and how it may only
be able to "see and think a gendered subject. "I Thus, "[i]nstead of asking,
'How law can transcend gender?,' the ... question ... become[s], 'How
does gender work in law and how does law work to produce gender?" 4
With this approach, the goal of gender neutrality is set aside. Law no longer
is defined as a system that can impose gender neutrality, but rather as one
that produces gender difference and "is seen as bringing into being ...
gendered subject positions" and perhaps also subjectivities or identities with
which individuals are associated.4'
and multi-ethnic feminists typically begin their arguments by suggesting the need to critique
and transform gender theory rather than doing the same from race theory.




40. Id. at 34.
41. Id.
42. Id. When elaborating on her analysis of law-as-gendered, Smart offers an historical
sketch of how "Woman is a gendered subject position which legal discourse brings into
being." Id. She argues for the importance of seeing a "symbiotic relationship" between types
of Woman (e.g., female criminal, unmarried mother) and the idea of Woman in contrast to
Man. Id. at 36. Here Smart makes the intriguing observation that Woman is a more elastic
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V. A Short Review of Empirical Studies of
Race and Criminal Courts
My review of the literature will focus on race in criminal courts43 and
the stage of court decision-making that has been the most highly studied:
sentencing.' Major reviews of the race and noncapital sentencing
literature through the early 1980s conclude that statistically significant race
effects showing greater leniency toward white defendants are not fre-
quent.45 The finding of "no difference" in race-based treatment is also
evident in studies of accused women,' although it should be underscored
that research on race and the criminal justice system has overwhelmingly
centered on the differential treatment of men. More recent appraisals of race
in justice system practices have produced scholarly contention about the
quality and the interpretations of evidence.47 Marjorie Zatz places the
concept, capable of being stretched across a range of types of women, whereas the concept
of femininity presupposes a particular race (white) and class (middle) location. Id. at 43
n. 18. However, she does not say how race and class relate to her claim that the "discursive
construct of modern Woman is mired in [the] double strategy" of the idea and types of
Woman. Id. at 36.
43. I do not consider empirical studies of race relations in policing. But see MANN,
supra note 18, at 115-65, for a review of such studies.
44. Scholars have noted that the cumulative effects of race from arrest to later stages
of criminal justice processing need to be examined; moreover, the last stage of court decision-
making is likely to have a more homogeneous composition than earlier stages. Hence, sample
selection bias may attenuate racial variation at this more advanced stage of court decision-
making. For an accessible review of these statistical problems, see Marjorie S. Zatz, The
Changing Forms of Racial/Ethnic Biases in Sentencing, 24 J. RES. ON CRIME & DELINQ. 69
(1987).
45. See John Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and
Critique of Sentencing Research, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM
1 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983); Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal
Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death
Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783, 798-801 (1981).
46. For a review of race and noncapital sentencing literature, see Daly, supra note 21.
47. Wilbanks, MacLean, and Milovanovic provide a flavor of the "is the criminal
justice system racist?" controversy. See supra note 14. Kempf and Austin are critical of
some earlier interpretations of "no race effect" in literature reviews. See supra note 11.
Samuel L. Myers, Jr., is critical of the statistical methods used in volumes one and two of
Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform to assess racial disparity. See Samuel L.
Myers, Jr., RacialDisparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing ReformsReduce Discrimination
in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 781, 787-91 (1993); see also RESEARCH ON
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research literature of the past and present in historical perspective.48 She
suggests that there have been four waves of research: studies conducted up
to the mid-1960s (Wave 1); those in the late 1960s and 1970s (Wave 2);
studies in the 1970s and 1980s (Wave 3); and those in the 1980s (Wave
4).49 Wave 1 was characterized by findings of "overt discrimination against
minority defendants. "' However, re-analysis of the studies during Wave
2 showed that except for the "use of the death penalty in the South," initial
findings of discrimination resulted from poor research analyses."' Wave
3 research used data from the late 1960s and 1970s and, with more
sophisticated data analyses, found evidence of "both overt and more subtle
forms of bias against minority defendants ... in some social contexts. "52
In Wave 4, studies may not have shown overt forms of bias, but subtle forms
were apparent.' Zatz's review may be updated by noting that in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the increasing rate of incarceration of black men and
women could be traced to the heightened enforcement and more severe
punishment for drug offenses.' One of Zatz's major points-that court
processing today may be "systematically biased due to institutionalized
discrimination"' so that the effect of race may be "indirect" or "subtle"
(rather than overt) through routine court practices-anticipates a line of
analysis that I shall consider in my race framework.
Another of Zatz's major points-that studies of court processing may
themselves be biased against a finding of discrimination-can be summarized
here. In brief, the argument is that statistical analyses may do a poor job of
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
48. See Zatz, supra note 44.





54. For analysis of incarceration for drug offenses, see Alfred Blumstein, Racial
Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743,751-53,
756-59 (1993); Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in
Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 367, 388-91 (1992); Myers, supra note 47, at 790.
For discussion of drug law from a more legal and policy perspective, see A Symposium On
Drug Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 457 (1990).
55. Zatz, supra note 44, at 81.
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modeling the adjudication process and of revealing both overt and subtle
forms of racialdiscrimination. These analyses focus on discrete decision
outcomes rather than the cumulative effects of disadvantage. The subjectivi-
ties of those accused are not considered: there is scant new research that
examines how the accused experience or negotiate the justice system-that
is, a "bottom-up" view of the system. Statistical analyses fail to examine the
disparate impact of reputedly "race-neutral" policies.
To summarize the body of statistical research on race and sentencing,
overt or "direct effects" of race may not be commonly found. But studies
probing "indirect effects," contextual effects, or subtle influences of
presumptively race-neutral laws and policies may find racial differences.
Scholars have challenged research studies in part for ignoring the racial
composition of those brought into the system and in part for how scholars
measure disparity or bias in a statistical sense.
V. Applying the Gender and Law Typology to
Race and Criminal Justice
In applying the gender and law typology to race and criminal justice,
I am mindful that although it is possible to replace the term gender with
race, the referent meanings are not the same. Thus, we should expect to see
an analogous, though not identical, set of issues and questions. For
example, Carol Smart draws from Elizabeth Spelman's observation that
additive analyses of gender and race miss the mark when they assume that
"all women are oppressed by sexism; some women are further oppressed by
racism."56  Such an approach ignores "differences [in] the contexts in
which Black women and white women experience sexism. "I Imagine that
we switched terms to elucidate the race-additive problem and said: "All
black people are oppressed by racism; black women are further oppressed
by sexism." For feminist scholarship in recent years, there has been a claim
of equivalence of race and gender; the one relationship is not viewed as
trumping the other, or the two are viewed as too deeply enmeshed to make
additive claims possible. I wonder whether a similar move could be made
as easily from critical race theory to gender, or from the experiences of
minority group women, who point out that racial oppression is the more
potently experienced oppression in their lives. Put another way, specifying
56. Smart, supra note 15, at 33 (quoting SPELMAN, supra note 35, at 125).
57. Id. (quoting SPELMAN, supra note 35, at 125).
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the racialized context to sexism may not mean the same thing as specifying
the gendered context to racism. And whether participants wish it or not,
there may be a hierarchy of "isms" involved in the analysis, even if these
may shift in specific social contexts.
W. Race and Criminal Law and Justice System Practices
Using Smart's typology,58 I will sketch analogous developments in
analyzing race and criminal law and justice system practices. For ease of
reference, I will abbreviate the latter term to justice system practices.
A. Justice System Practices Are Racist
With ajustice system practices-as-racist approach, the focus is on how
criminal law disadvantages minority group members by differentiating
people according to race and ethnicity. Minority group members may be
allocated fewer resources, may be judged by different standards, may be
denied opportunities, or may not be recognized as affected by certain harms.
Evidence of racist practices would include the following:
Over- and under-zealous policing. Over-zealous policing is seen in
profiling drug offenders, in police harassment of street groups, and in police
shakedowns and beatings. 9 Under-zealous policing is seen in responses to
calls for domestic violence.'
Over- and under-zealous prosecution. Over-zealous prosecution is
evident in denying lower bail or release on recognizance, in seeking
convictions more strenuously against minority group defendants, and in
58. In this section, I shall be using Smart's phrasing and words without necessarily
putting quotes around them. For referent pages, see supra notes 26-42.
59. For a review of the "war on drugs," see Dwight L. Greene, Drug Decriminaliza-
tion: A Chorus in Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 457 (1990); Michael Z.
Letwin, Report From the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street Level Drug Enforcement in
New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 795 (1990). In another
article, Dwight Greene provides examples of and commentary on the over-zealous policing
of black men in drug profiling and police stops, among other indices of judicial "pluralistic
ignorance." See Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial PluralisticIgnorance,
and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 2022-
33 (1993) [hereinafter Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto].
60. See AMINA MAMA, THE HIDDEN STRUGGLE (1989); Kathleen J. Ferraro, Policing
Woman Battering, 36 Soc. PROBS. 61 (1989).
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pushing for incarceration or longer terms.61 Under-zealous prosecution is
seen in not treating certain forms of violent crimes with minority member
victims as seriously as crimes with white victims.62
Words, actions, or inactions. Certain words, actions, or inactions
suggest the superiority of majority group members and the inferiority of
minority group members or use negative group characteristics as a general
rule to describe individuals and to make inferences on their motives,
behavior, or potential danger to society.63
One problem in documenting justice system practices-as-racist is the
presence of both over- and under-zealous (or indifferent) behavior by
officials. If both types of behavior are occurring, then "on average" there
may appear to be no difference in officials' responses as the one may cancel
the other.6' More problematically, as William Wilbanks suggests, any
result may be defined as racist. As an example, he notes that:
[A] lower percentage of blacks (than whites) being convicted has been
interpreted by accusers as racist in that this result indicates that
charges against blacks were often without substance. On the other
hand, if more blacks were convicted, this result would also be viewed
by accusers as being indicative of racism, since black defendants were
treated more harshly.'
As contentious as Wilbanks's analyses can be to critics, this may be one area
in which an anti-racist analysis is most vulnerable to criticism.
For me, this problem is most evident in race-of-victim discrimination
claims. As documented by David Baldus and colleagues and by Gary
61. Several recent studies that follow defendants through these stages evince one or
more of these "over-zealous" prosecutorial actions. See ROGER HOOD, RACE AND
SENTENCING (1992); Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: A
Summary, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 15 (1985).
62. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990);
GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT (1989).
63. See Farnworth et al., supra note 11, at 56-57 (Latinos); Zatz, supra note 44, at 83-
84 (general images of "danger"); Zatz et al., supra note 21, at 107-09 (Native Americans);
see also Sheri L. Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739 (1993).
64. Research studies rarely examine the form of canceling out that I am referring to
here. They more frequently focus on finding race effects when samples are disaggregated by
judges; by smaller geographical units; or by urban, suburban, and rural areas.
65. Wilbanks, supra note 14, at 6-7.
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LaFree,' some violent crimes (murder and rape) with white victims receive
a more active prosecutorial response and a more severe sentence than those
with black victims. In the aggregate, this means that white defendants are
subject to harsher punishment than black defendants since most violent
crimes are intraracial. The problem then is how to redress the devaluation
of black bodies. The answer, it appears, is to increase the punishment of
black defendants.
Whatever the wisdom of using race-of-victim discrimination
arguments to challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty,67 an even
more immediate issue is the lose-lose situations of sentencing officials in
black (or minority group) intraracial cases. Here, I wish to draw from my
New Haven study by giving an example of a case that, however a judge were
to decide it, would be criticized.
The case is that of Barry, a young black man in his early twenties,
who beat his uncle, a man in his early forties, to death one evening. The
incident occurred when Barry returned to a room he shared with his uncle
in a rooming house and found his uncle on the floor, apparently drunk. He
later told the police that he slapped his uncle a few times to wake him.
Regarding the incident, Barry's mother, the victim's sister, said:
[My brother] must have provoked [Barry]. Maybe they were out
drinking and hanging out. Maybe they were arguing. I know my son
didn't kill him. I don't feel bad about my brother. He was always
getting into fights. He was not a nice sight to see. He was a drug
addict. There was no sorrow when he died.
Barry pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter and received a ten-year term.
(Note that ten years was the maximum term that defendants in my sample
received in this court when pleading gulity to manslaughter.)
What should court officials do in these cases? They can agree with
Barry's mother that the victim was a less than fully "worthy" person and
reduce Barry's sentence. Conversely, they can argue that "we value all lives
equally" and sentence Barry's crime as severely as other homicides. In New
Haven, the court took the latter approach, but I am not convinced that this
approach was just, either to Barry and his family members or to other
66. See supra note 62.
67. I see race-of-victim discrimination arguments as a way to challenge the death
penalty, and in that context, they have strategic value. However, advocates should also begin
to consider what factors, ideally, ought to be considered in nondeath penalty cases.
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defendants and their families who appealed to court officials to understand
the situational contexts giving rise to conflicts ending in death. It is
important to note that while race of victim arguments give attention to the
differential value placed on minority group victims' lives, a victim's class
also plays a role.
The preceding examples of under- and over-zealous policing and
prosecution demonstrate why it can be difficult to identify and specify racist
practices and responses when such actions are moving in different directions.
A general problem with the justice system-as-racist stance is its assumption
that it is possible to correct these problems of "racial bias" by treating those
accused of crime equally. But what is "equal justice" exactly? And is
"equal justice" the goal? In light of the history of race relations and justice
system practices (as well as those outside law) in the United States, equal
justice is not an unreasonable goal. It suggests that minority group members
be permitted the same legal protections as majority group members: it is a
commitment to notions of procedural equality. For noncapital sentencing,
so long as judges exercise discretion in a manner that does not exceed
prescribed statutory or guideline sentences, and for capital sentencing, so
long as judges or jurors do not intentionally discriminate, the sentencing
decision will likely withstand any review.
With respect to empirical studies of policing and the adjudication
process, equal justice is restricted to the claim that, "all else equal," minority
group defendants ought to be treated the same as majority group defendants.
For example, minority group defendants should have the same legal
protections; they should not be subjected to higher bail setting or to more
severe sentences. Every study of racial disparity in court processes is
framed with the preceding assumptions of "equal justice" in mind. After
entering many variables into regression equations-essentially bleaching out
the race relations in crime-scholars try to determine if there is any residual
"race effect" in justice system practices.
The idea that justice should be race-blind is encapsulated in Roger
Hood's discussion of the implications of his research on race and sentencing
in England. In light of officials' "duty to avoid discriminating against any
persons on the grounds of race or sex or any other improper ground," Hood
notes that judges' decisions may have to be monitored.6" Thus, in his
view, the goal is to treat all defendants before the court equally. Such a goal
assumes that it is possible (to use Smart's terms) to "override [racial]
.68. HOOD, supra note 61, at 191.
448
RACIST, WHITE, AND RA CIALIZED
difference as if it were epiphenomenal rather than embedded in how we
comprehend and negotiate the social order. "69
Neither traditional social science research nor legal arguments may be
able to go beyond the restrictions that liberal law places on proving
disparities of treatment. Such proof normally assumes that different
treatment and discrimination are the same thing. However, I can imagine
a system of justice in which racial differences were not denied, but instead
were brought forth explicitly as a dimension to decision making.7" Indeed,
69. Smart, supra note 15, at 31-32. A judicial appearance of evenhandedness is
crucial, especially for judges who are members of minority groups. For example, Bruce
Wright, a black judge, writing in his autobiography about his time on the criminal bench,
said: "[When] I considered race, it was to make certain that neither white nor black skin
would be discriminated against in my court." BRUCE WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE
JUSTICE 202 (1987). In examining the decision to incarcerate, one study found that black
judges were more likely than white judges to sentence white defendants than black defendants
to prison. See Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI.
126, 131-33 (1988). However, upon closer examination, the authors found that black judges
were more inclined to sentence both black and white defendants to incarceration and were
more "even-handed" than white judges, who sentenced more black defendants than white
defendants to incarceration. Id. at 132-33.
70. Richard Delgado develops a compatible argument that focuses on "severe
environmental deprivation" as a criminal defense. See Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social
Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQ. J. 9 (1985). However, Delgado is careful to point out that the
defense of "rotten social background" is "individualized and subjective" and that the
determination is made about a "particular defendant's case [that has] a particular excusing
condition." Id. at 66. Myers takes issue with Charles Ogletree's proposal that "judges should
be given discretion to take into account an offender's race as a mitigating factor." Myers,
supra note 47, at 792 (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1960 (1988)). Myers asks,
"What does this mean? That black crooks will be excused for being crooks because of the
legacy of slavery and racism that may help explain why they and their ancestors have been
denied opportunities and thus were thrust into crime?" Id. While acknowledging the merits
of Ogletree's critique of the federal sentencing guidelines, Myers suggests that:
[It] falls into the same trap into which many of the attempts to deal with racial
disparities in employment or other economic areas fall. If there are gaps, we
need to have 'affirmative action' to eliminate them. In the instance of
sentencing reforms, it is not clear that taking into account race or other
characteristics of the offender will do anything except lead to reestablishment
of the pre-reform disparities in sentencing.
Id. Gary Peller argues that substantive criminal law itself "could be read as embodying a
culturally particular way of ascribing responsibility and punishment." Gary Peller, Criminal
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it is as much the "denial of difference,"" racial or otherwise, as it is major-
ity group negative prejudice against minority group members that can be the
source of the problem.
Drawing from critical race theory, we learn that racial dominance can
be achieved in at least two ways: the older form, by overtly racist practices,
and the newer form, by practices that are ostensibly race-neutral. As
Anthony Cook explains, the former "predicate[s] subordination on
difference," and the latter "predicate[s] subordination on sameness. ''72
Elaborating, Cook says:
In [an earlier period], the White standard was a "my" standard to
which Blacks were thought incapable of conforming because of natural
inferiority. In the [later period], the White standard was recast as an
"our" standard to which Blacks were invited to conform against the
backdrop of undisturbed allocations of wealth and power created by a
racist history that made conformity, for most, practically impossi-
ble.73
Therefore, from a critical race theory perspective, eliminating overt racism,
though a worthy goal, is certainly not sufficient. So called race-neutral or
race-blind approaches promote new forms of racial oppression.
B. Justice System Practices Are White
Extending on Smart's terms, one need only visit any urban police
station, criminal court, jail, or prison and observe the racial composition of
those enforcing criminal law and those who are its subjects. On this issue,
Judge Bruce Wright asked:
Do white judges ever [wonder] why there are so many black defen-
dants in criminal cases? Do white judges ever wonder about why
there are so few black lawyers appearing before them? Do they ever
inquire about the history of bar associations that used to exclude Jews
Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 61 TuL.
L. REv. 2231, 2252 (1993).
71. AIJDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in
SISTER OUTSIDER 115, 122 (1984) (refusal to recognize differences).
72. Anthony E. Cook, The SpiritualMovementTowardsJustice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
1007, 1010.
73. Id.
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and blacks? Do they ever ponder... the reasons that there are so
few black judges?74
In addition to Judge Wright's comments, observe the racial and class
composition of the producers of knowledge about crime and the justice
system and those who are its subjects.
Having noted this color-coded (and class-compounded) organizational
scheme, we need to take a step beyond it by identifying how majority
whiteness and middle class values are structured in criminal law and justice
system practices. The precise elements of a "white point of view" (what is
often referred to as institutionalized racism) have not been clarified for crim-
inal law and justice system practices to the extent that the "male point of
view" has. One problem is that "white" has both class and cultural dimen-
sions. It includes notions of what constitutes appropriate dress, demeanor,
ways of speaking, and child-rearing practices; it means believing that
existing rules and authorities are legitimate and fair; and it implies trust that
schooling is related to paid employment and that decisions in schools and
work sites are based on meritocratic principles of ability and discipline.
As applied to criminal law and justice system practices, there are many
historical examples of white justice: the forced removal of Native Americans
from their lands and the forced enrollment of Native American children in
white schools, the holding of Japanese-Americans in internment camps
during World War II, the shifting and selective focus on particular racial
minority groups in enforcing drug laws, and the criminalizing of labor and
political protest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and again
in the 1950s and 1960s, among others.75 Each example speaks to majority
citizen and state demands for "order" or for the control of unruly or danger-
ous groups, typically constructed as "other" or as threats to public safety.
Is it possible to see a similar logic in contemporary justice system
practices? We can begin by observing, as British scholar Barbara Hudson
does, that "[w]hatever criminal justicepolicies and institutional arrangements
are adopted ... the poor, the disturbed, the migrant, disadvantaged ethnic
minorities are consistently overpenalised and overimprisoned."76 Hudson
discusses why this is the case and argues that the problem lies in legal theory
74. WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 13.
75. See TAKAIG, supra note 20; Frankie Y. Bailey, Law, Justice, and "Americans":An
Historical Overview, in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10.
76. BARBARA A. HUDSON, PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 3 (1993).
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itself, which cannot appreciate the fact that "the world as an arena for the
[expression] of free choices is a perspective of the privileged and.., is far
from apparent to those whose lives are constricted by material and
ideological handicaps."' "Legal ideology" has been able to successfully
enforce "equality of obligation in a materially unequal society."78 Against
a "unitary, objective, rationally superior perspective," the constituents of
the legal or juridical voice, Hudson argues for a plurality of perspectives.
This approach would translate to the same act meaning different things to
people acting from different motives, social situations, or degrees of power
in social relationships.7 9 The assumption of an abstracted, equally
responsible, equally able individual is at the heart of contemporary liberal
law. Yet, whatever autonomy and dignity such a view may invest in
individuals, it denies the existence of structured inequalities based on class
and caste.
We may wonder, what should be the relationship of historical and
contemporary inequalities to definitions of crime, criminal responsibility,
and punishment? For example, as Andrew von Hirsch, a well-known
desert theorist, asks, "to what extent [should] social injustice diminish
criminal actors' responsibility for their conduct?"s" Furthermore, he notes
that "it may be worth worrying about the implications of denying fault for
the deprived," which suggests that those seen to be less than responsible for
their actions are also viewed as less than fully adult.8'
These are profound questions-more than I can consider wisely or
adequately here-about the relationship of social and economic inequalities
to crime, criminal responsibility, and punishment.' But we could take a
step back and note that when we say criminal law and justice system
practices are white, we are noting that law (and its agents) have a "point of
view." We would expect that our claim would be denied by law and its
77. Id. at 195.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id. at 195; see also Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, supra note 59.
80. Andrew von Hirsch, The Politics of "JustDeserts, "92 CANADIANJ. CRIMINOLOGY
397, 408 (1990).
81. Id. at409.
82. See supra note 70 for a related discussion of these issues by Delgado, Myers,
Ogletree, and Peller.
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agents as outside the realm of acceptable legal discourse. 3 So too for the
traditional social sciences.8s Thus, within the parameters of normal
science or law, one may not be permitted to make an argument that law and
legal practices are white (or male) because this would undermine the very
principles upon which these systems of knowledge are built: objectivity and
neutrality-the reputedly unbiased "view from nowhere.."5
The indeterminacy of this position should be plain; it may not be
possible to challenge justice system practices with the claim that they are
white because clashing epistemological principles may not permit such
challenge or dialogue. The proof of the claim must be within law's terms
or those of positive social science. There can be several ways to start the
conversation, however: by demonstrating that (1) white justice cannot
"hear" or empathize with the stories of crime involving minority group
members, (2) white justice overcriminalizes minority group members in
policing and justice system responses, and (3) white justice expects
lawbreakers to become conventional and "straight" with ease and does not
recognize the barriers to achieving this status that minority group members
face. In each area, apparently neutral rules or policies in law enforcement
and justice system practices can be shown to have a disparate impact.86
When considering these areas, we should be mindful of divisions
within "the black community" (or other minority group communities) on
83. The argument that law's "point of view" is male is explicitly developed in
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635 (1983).
84. For a discussion of the instabilities that arise in science when traditional notions of
neutrality are called into question, see HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 27.
85. See Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 27, at 133.
86. I take it as axiomatic that the lawbreaking of the more marginal is more likely to
be strongly condemned and treated as "more serious" than that of the more affluent. Further,
I take it as axiomatic that the selective enforcement and crackdowns on alcohol, drugs,
prostitution, gangs, and the like are attempts to regulate largely minority group (or
immigrant) populations. These general themes are part of the coda of critical criminology.
See RICHARD QUINNEY, CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY (1974); CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Richard Quinney ed., 1974), for arguments
in this tradition. Moreover, as Zatz points out for the criminal court, cumulative
disadvantages to more marginal defendants (such as the inability to secure freedom in the
pretrial period and the impact of previous arrests) escalate the apparent "seriousness" of their
cases. Zatz, supra note 44, at 75-77.
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the proper role of law enforcement and priorities for justice system practic-
es.' Disagreements over drug legalization, housing policy evictions, and
the prosecution of pregnant drug-using women, among other areas, reveal
strong conservative and liberal ideological stances.88 Hence, to say that
justice system practices are "white" does not imply that there is a coherent
or unified "black" or "multi-ethnic" justice waiting in the wings.
1. White Justice Cannot "Hear" or Empathize With Stories of Harm
In writing about the kinds of stories told by black (or other minority)
legal scholars that white scholars will listen and respond to, Jerome
McCristal Culp identifies two types" of stories that can be heard: the color
blind story ("'[w]e wouldn't need to be race conscious if we could simply
become blind to racial difference'"),9 and the religious redemption story
("any current evil will ultimately be eliminated by [the] natural processes [of
culture]").' A third story is not heard. This story "attempts to use the
observation of one black life to change the way we look at the world"'" in
a manner that "demand[s] attention from those in authority who often ignore
the pleas at the margin. "I How might these insights on the voices of black
intellectuals and law scholars apply to those accused of crime?
When analyzing the New Haven court materials, I discovered a race
and gender patterning in the defendants' social histories in the pre-sentence
investigation reports (PSI).93 For more women than men, the PSI writers
depicted the criminalization process as containing explicit links to victimiza-
87. See Austin, supra note 22, at 1770-71.
88. Elijah Anderson also describes the ideological differences among the black
residents in the Philadelphia neighborhoods that he studied. See ELIJAH ANDERSON,
STREETWISE (1990).
89. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., You Can Take Them to Water But You Can't Make Them
Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1021, 1027.
90. Id. at 1029.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1039.
93. A PSI is a document that a probation officer writes to guide thejudge at sentencing.
In Connecticut, it is a confidential state document, normally three to four single-spaced pages
in length. It contains sections describing the offense; the victim's and defendant's versions
of the offense; the victim's desires in sentencing the defendant; the defendant's social history
and prior record; the defendant's current work and family situation, mental health history,
and drug or alcohol problems; and the probation officer's sentence recommendation.
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tion, whether from growing up in violent households or in adult relations
with abusive or dominating men. Thus, the boundaries between victim and
offender were blurred more often in the women's social histories. An image
of blurred boundaries allows a defendant to incorporate a victimized status
within a criminalized status. Such a construction can render a defendant's
crime less blameworthy and more a product of past or current problems than
a chosen course of action.
Of all the race and gender groups, black men's social histories were
least likely to be constructed with this blurred boundaries theme. Black men
were more likely to be categorized as committed to the street life, and they
were least likely to be seen as reformable. I found greater class and racial
differences among the men than among the women in this area. One reason,
I suspect, is the set of social relations-and the knowledge produced from
them-between probation officers and defendants. I learned from interviews
with the probation officers that they found it easier to elicit information from
the women defendants than the men. They found the women to be more
"self-analytical" and to give more information about themselves; the men
seemed to be "more guarded," and the probation officers did not probe
further on their experiences with victimization, whether at home or in street
settings. The women defendants, both minorities and whites, seemed better
able to negotiate their subordinated, deviant status with state officials than
the minority group men, who more often contested their deviant status and
seemed to be recalcitrant.' This is an instance in which white justice has
a gendered face: both minority group and white women's stories of harm
apparently could be heard, but men's, especially black men's, could not.
A defendant's discussion of his or her social history with a court
official is one thing, but what about the story of the crime? Does white
justice not hear that story? There are several genres of stories that seem to
be difficult to hear. They include the reasonableness of using violence to
settle disputes between gang members and to establish one's honor and
reputation. They may also include the reasonableness of selling small
quantities of drugs as a way to make a living. While lawbreakers use any
number of "techniques of neutralization,"' including "everyone's doing it"
and "the crack made me do it," white justice could begin to hear law-
94. For further discussion, see DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note
1, at 83-88.
95. See Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory
of Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 664 (1957).
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breakers' stories by listening to their families and community members or
those they victimized. For example, women, like Barry's mother, whose
sons have been involved in serious and deadly assaults should be listened to
with care.
One case that exemplified the inability of white justice to hear the
story of the crime was Andrew's assault of two police officers. Andrew was
going to meet his friend Bo to play basketball when he saw two police offi-
cers beating Bo. He jumped in and began fighting, kicking one officer in the
face and striking the second with a blunt instrument. At his sentencing,
Andrew told the judge, "I had seen that two police officers had picked [Bo]
up and slammed him on the ground. And started beating on him. I came
over and asked them to let him up, and they did not do that. So Ijumped in
at that time." Andrew's case was sensitive and celebrated, and respected
members of the community planned to speak on his behalf on the day of
sentencing. His behavior seemed out of character in light of his performance
in school, his extracurricular activities (for example, he sang in the choir),
and the fact that he had never been in trouble before. From Andrew's point
of view, he believed the police were assaulting his friend. From the state's
point of view, represented in the words of the judge sentencing Andrew, the
assault was "an absolutely vicious, unjustified, inexcusable assault."
(Apparently, the police were attempting to arrest Bo for a robbery he had
allegedly just committed.) The judge was not swayed by the community
members who spoke on Andrew's behalf (nor did he allow the sentencing to
be postponed to another day when more people would be able to speak).
Rather, he said to Andrew's defense attorney, "I would listen to these
distinguished people, [but] the likelihood of their influencing a decision with
respect to sentence, it just does not exist. "I Thus, part of the power of
white justice is the refusal to listen to minority group lawbreakers' or
community members' stories of crime and victimization.
2. White Justice Overcriminalizes
I shall consider two areas: drug law enforcement and hustling in the
informal economy.
Drug Enforcement. Contemporary law enforcement and court prac-
tices have focused intensively on the sale and possession of drugs. During
my research, drug offenses were the modal conviction for women, even
96. Excerpt from the sentencing transcript.
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more so than for men; drug offenses were, however, a higher share of the
convictions for black and Latino men than for white men. 97 Race and
ethnicity seemed to play a more overt role in the felony court's handling of
drug cases than in the robbery, larceny, and interpersonal violence cases.
This is because "drug harms"-which are amorphous, but which are
typically measured by the amount and types of drugs sold-are decoupled
from the punishment. New Haven felony court officials based the
seriousness of drug cases on the quantity of previous lawbreaking-that is,
evidence of prior arrests or convictions for drug selling-more than on the
quantity of drugs sold, unless the quantity was very large. Minority group
members are put at a particular disadvantage when prior records are used in
these cases.
Research by Ruth Peterson and John Hagan on the handling of drug
offenses in several New York State courts during the late 1970s suggested
that a portion of minority group drug users, those with minimal or no
previous arrests, were viewed as "victims" and treated more leniently, while
those with more developed records were viewed as "villains" and responded
to harshly. 98 It is* important to see that "more developed records" are a
consequence, in part, of pro-active police policies that focus on certain parts
of cities, on certain residences, or on certain people. Thus, a minority drug-
using victim in New Haven can easily be transformed into a more loathsome
entity: a drug seller who is viewed as "unreformed, unrepentant." Those
words were delivered by the presiding judge when he sentenced Mary, a
black woman in her early fifties, who pleaded guilty to one count of selling
narcotics. Thejudge knew Mary from previous court appearances and noted
that she had been convicted for selling narcotics twenty years earlier.
Rennie's drug case is another example. When the police executed a
search warrant of his apartment, they found less than five grams of heroin
and cocaine, a relatively small quantity. However, Rennie was on parole at
the time, and this status appears to have caused him to receive a sentence of
five years, the longest sentence for any defendant convicted of drug charges
in this court.
97. Of defendants convicted in the New Haven felony court over a five-year period
(1981-1986), the share of convictions for sale or possession of drug offenses for each race-
ethnicity and gender group was as follows: 38% for white women, 33% for Latina women,
31% for black women, 20 % for black men, 17 % for Latino men, and 11% for white men.
98. See Ruth D. Peterson & John Hagan, Changing Conceptions of Race: Towards an
Account of Anomalous Findings of Sentencing Research, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 56, 59 (1984).
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Research on the impact of mandatory sentences for drug sale and
possession in the federal court system suggests that such schemes have
increased the proportion of black defendants incarcerated to a greater degree
than the proportion of white defendants; 9 the same pattern is seen in state
systems."'° Whether it is an ostensibly neutral law about getting tough on
certain drug offenders (such as users of crack cocaine rather than powdered
cocaine), or whether it is using previous convictions or parole status as a
measure of the seriousness of the prosecuted offense, the criminalizing of
certain drugs and the enforcement of drug laws is one example of the
disparate impact of white justice on minority group members.
Hustling in the Informal Economy. Regina Austin calls for "a legal
praxis" rooted in "folk law" which assesses, on the basis of survival, "what
laws must be obeyed and what laws may be justifiably ignored.",0 ' She
is particularly concerned that informal economy activities not be criminalized
unless they "destroyl- communal life or exploitI a part of the population that
cannot be protected informally."'" Such informal economic activities-or
hustling-can be the start of a "more self-reliant black urban communi-
t[y]. "103
An example of criminalizing entrepreneurial efforts is renewed efforts
to ban unlicensed vendors from city streets. In New York City, for
example, where there is a ceiling of about 850 licenses for general vendors
(that is, nonfood vendors), there are an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 unlicensed
general vendors." Store owners complain of lost revenue, unfair compe-
tition, and congestion and noise in front of their shops, and the City
estimates that $300 million is lost in uncollected sales taxes. 05 The street
vendors argue that peddling offers one way to gain an economic toehold:
"To climb the entrepreneurial ladder.""
99. See Meierhoefer, supra note 54, at 388-92.
100. See Blumstein, supra note 54, at 754-56.
101. Austin, supra note 22, at 1816.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1803.
104. Giuliani Expands Policy to Ban Illegal Vendors,N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1994, atB1.
105. Id.
106. Id. at B4.
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3. White Justice Expects Lawbreakers to Become Conventional
and "Straight" with Ease
One of the more striking conditions of probation that judges imposed
on defendants in the New Haven court was to "seek employment" or "find
a job." Such a response suggests a denial of the particular conditions in
which many young, urban, largely minority group men live. While most
such men are law-abiding, the chances that someone convicted of crime can
"find a job" are not as likely as the New Haven judges imagine. One
wonders if these judges have read recent accounts of young men attempting
to seek jobs;1  if they understand the meaning of gang affiliation in men's
and women's lives;1 8 or if they are aware of the difficulties in negotiating
one's way around welfare agencies, housing offices, unemployment
agencies, and the justice system."° The individual, self-help, work-ethic
approach denies the structural barriers to successfully seeking employment,
remaining employed, and becoming more conventional, particularly when
one has a criminal record, which makes finding a job even more difficult.
As Regina Austin reports, the irony is that there is no end of a well-
established work ethic in studies of welfare women and that "[p]oor and
working class enclaves have an abundance of workers unskilled except in the
hard work of hustling."110 Moreover, some young black men may "spurn
the injunctions of parents, police, teachers, and other authorities, but they
embrace the entrepreneurial and consumption cultures of mainstream
America."III
In pointing out that justice system practices are white, a point of view
becomes visible and its consequences can be documented. However, just as
Smart critiques the law-as-male position, we can see similar problems in
characterizing justice system practices as white. Foremost, it may be mis-
107. See, e.g., JOHN M. HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FoLKS 124-27 (1988); MERCER L.
SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989); William
Finnegan, Out There (pts. 1 & 2), NEW YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990, at 51, NEW YORKER, Sept.
17, 1990, at 60.
108. See ANNE CAMPBELL, THE GIRLS IN THE GANG (2d ed. 1990); JOAN W. MOORE,
GOING DOWN TO THE BARRIO: HOMEBOYs AND HOMEGIRLs IN CHANGE (1991).
109. See PAT CARLEN, WOMEN, CRIME AND POVERTY (1988).
110. Austin, supra note 22, at 1806.
111. Id. at 1786 (quoting Jefferson Morely, Contradictions of Cocaine Capitalism,
NATION, Oct. 2, 1989, at 344).
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leading to assume (using Smart's words) that white people benefit or are
celebrated in a rehearsal of practices that claim universality. In addition, the
justice system practices-as-white stance gives priority to one division while
overlooking other sources of difference along the lines of class, age, or
gender. Finally, in analyzing justice system practices as white, we may be
unduly color-coding practices that are equally linked to nation, culture, and
class. If, however, "white" stands as a metaphor for the dominant cultural
or class point of view, the justice system practices-as-white position may be
able to withstand these criticisms.
C. Justice System Practices Are Racialized
When we say that justice system practices are racialized, we upend the
race and criminal justice system relationship. Rather than analyzing sources
of racial and ethnic variability injustice system outcomes, the focus instead
is on how race and ethnicity are brought forth as racialized subject positions
by criminal law and justice system practices. One need not assume that
justice system practices invariably exploit minority groups and serve the
majority group. Such practices are assumed to operate through a racializing
differentiated lens. Injustice can be identified without necessarily having to
compare minority groups to majority groups. In taking this approach,
scholars analyze how criminal law and justice system practices may only be
able to "see and think a [racialized] subject.""' Rather than asking how
justice system practices can transcend race, they ask: "'How does [race]
work in law and how does law work to produce [race]?
' ' 13
Such an approach seems antithetical to several centuries of political
struggle and thousands of pounds of research papers and legal briefs on
racial discrimination, criminal law, and the justice system. And it is.
Although there is disagreement among black Americans on this issue, the
prevailing approach to the eradication of majority group racial prejudice has
been to remove racial considerations by attempting to ignore color and
cultural differences. Moreover, if we say that racializing discourses are
everywhere apparent and move in cross-cutting ways, not always to the
benefit of a majority group, then they will be difficult to "capture" or to
document with conventional legal arguments or positive social science.
112. Smart, supra note 15, at 34 (substituting race for gender).
113. Id. (substituting race for gender).
460
RACIST, WHITE, AND RACIAL1ZED
From a practices-as-racialized position, it will be difficult to show a
uniformly or consistently disadvantaging impact of "white justice."
However, by contemplating the idea that justice system practices are
racialized, we have new ways of seeing how race matters, in both its fluidity
and obdurateness. We should expect to find racial dominance flourishing in
the newer regime of race neutrality as it did under the older regime of white
superiority. We may be able to speak more openly about racial and ethnic
differences.
Those working in a racializing framework argue for moving "beyond
the illusory poles of black and white, 14 even as race continues to be
constructed with these terms. High-profile cases that have received the
greatest analytical attention, using a racializing frame, are the New Bedford
Gang Rape, the Central Park Jogger Case, the Tawana Brawley Case, the
Senate Confirmation Hearings for Clarence Thomas, and the police beating
of Rodney King. I shall give an example from the Thomas hearings.
In analyzing the Clarence Thomas hearings, Wahneema Lubiano
argues that "a specifically nuanced 'blackness' was constructed and
strengthened by narratives pre-existing in the national historical memory
around two figures, the 'black lady' and the 'welfare mother' or
'queen""" (referring to Anita Hill and to Thomas's sister, respectively).
Later, Lubiano suggests that when:
[B]lackness from [the] commonsense perspective [that is, "whites are
out to get us"] equals only black manhood, Hill's race becomes both
hypervisible and invisible at the same time. That it "disappeared" and
"reappeared" is important, but more important is how it disappeared
and reappeared at the same time. With no check on Thomas's
evocation of his blackness, with no real check by Democrats or the
mainstream press, Hill got whiter. 6
Lubiano's essay shows that race is not simply attached to people's bodies as
a natural or stable characteristic; rather, the terms of a dispute can color the
authenticity and believability of disputants and their claims. Moreover, the
contemporary enactment of race in the Thomas hearings drew from historical
114. GINA DENT, BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 6 (1992).
115. Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels:
Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDER-ING POWER 323,330
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
116. id. at348-49.
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images and metaphors about "blackness" and "whiteness." While we can
learn a good deal using the justice system practices-as-racialized approach
from analyses of high-profile cases, there is a downside to this focus: We
may overlook how justice system practices are racialized in routine ways.
In addition to attending more carefully to the common cases and the
routinization of justice practices, another fruitful area of inquiry is the
mental processes of members of sentencing commissions or legislative
bodies while they are setting penalties for crimes. That is, what particular
victim-offender relations (stranger? interracial? the "black stranger
predator?") is in their imagination? Samuel Myers has called attention to the
ways in which the federal sentencing guidelines may have "unintentionally
institutionalize[d] prior racial discrimination" by using parole board
criteria." 7  If apparently objective scoring criteria mask racializing
elements, it would be important to peel back the layers of such construc-
tions.
If justice system practices may "call forth" race, including
subjectivities or identities of individuals, another research angle is how
lawbreakers themselves take on an "outlaw" status and, by resisting state
authority, affirm in their own way lawbreaking images and practices. For
example, Timothy Simone suggests that some adolescent minority males "are
so thoroughly constituted as victims that they resist cooperation with any
person who talks about their victimage. They demand to be viewed as the
hunters and 'savages' that the general population, preoccupied with crime
and safety, is more than willing to see them as.""' Rap lyrics can be
another instance of this phenomena."19
The major problem with the justice system practices-as-racialized
position is that its emphasis on the multiple lines of racial construction and
the racialized constituents of criminal law and justice system institutions may
produce knowledge that appears useless for changing policy or for social
change more generally. It is one thing to appreciate how people and texts
are drenched in racializing codes and metaphors, but quite another to know
what to do with that knowledge. And if the past three centuries of United
States history are a guide, it will require deft arguments and politics to work
117. Myers, supra note 47, at 807.
118. TIMOTHYM. SIMONE, ABOUT FACE: RACEIN POSTMODERN AMERICA 160 (1989).
119. Regina Austin suggests that "[r]ap music is the paradigm for the praxis of a politics
of identification." Austin, supra note 22, at 1812. She views it as serving a bridge between
"street and straight cultures." Id.
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with explicit racialized imagery as a means to transform relations of racial
domination.
VIII. Conclusion
I have presented three ways of conceptualizing the relationship of race
to criminal law and justice system practices. Justice system practices-as-
racist focuses on ways of exposing differential treatment and eradicating it.
The goal is equal justice and a race-neutral or color-blind society. Most
social science scholarship has been framed within this position, and virtually
all legal arguments (except those centering on disparate impact) are made
from this position.
Justice system practices-as-white assumes that the point of view of
criminal law and justice system practices is white and middle class. Neutral
and objective standards and policies are shown to be systematically skewed
against the poor, minority group members, and others at society's margins.
The goal is a multicultural (or perhaps radically pluralist) justice.
Justice system practices-as-racialized assumes that racial and ethnic
relations structure criminal law and justice system practices so profoundly
that legal subjects can be expected to be saturated with racializing qualities.
Majority group members may not always benefit from a position of
dominance, nor are minority group members always subordinated. The goal
is to show how discursive practices of criminal law and the justice system
produce race and ethnicity.
These arguments about race in the criminal justice system can
sometimes be used at the same time. However, it is useful to see the
different emphasis each takes-which position activists, practitioners, and
scholars take, and what assumptions we work from-when discussing race,
criminal law, and justice system practices.120
120. Recall my earlier concern with the limits of the conflict and labeling perspectives.
Using the race scheme, we can see that conflict theory is most congenial with ajustice system
practices-as-white position and labeling is most congenial with a justice system practices-as-
racist position. However, scholars use both (often interchangeably) to predict unequal
outcomes of court decisions, in which minority group members will get the least favorable
outcome. Were a conflict analysis to analyze the disparate impact of reputed neutral rules,
it would be closer to its orienting assumptions. Because researchers use both theories in the
service of "equal treatment" studies, they are unable to deal with heterogeneous findings of
no race difference, differences in the expected direction, and differences in the unexpected
direction.
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The justice system practices-as-racist adherents will search for a
variety of overt forms of differential racial treatment, although they may be
stymied by how to represent some differences as acceptable and others as
"racist" or discriminatory. Proponents of this group are less concerned with
the broader question of achieving social justice (or a more substantively than
procedurally centered notion of justice); they work instead on insuring that
minority group members receive the same treatment as those in the majority
group.
The justice practices-as-white advocates will identify the systemic or
institutionalized forms of a "white and middle class point of view," whose
laws and policies may appear to be race-neutral, but are not in practice.
Proponents of this group are impatient with the limits of equal treatment
studies. They are critical of empirical work that does not address the
historical and social structural dynamics of race and ethnic relations, and
they work to transform the apparatus of a white-dominated power structure.
The justice system practices-as-racialized advocates are interested in
how race is fractured and socially constructed within and from criminal law
and justice system practices. Race is not only separated from a biological
body (as the justice system practices-as-white position suggests); it also has
no fixed social determinants. Moreover, because proponents do not assume
that a white-dominated power structure can operate in ways that consistently
disadvantage minority group members, there is an openness toward seeing
how minority group members can construct racialized identities that
challenge and confirm dominant group members' expectations.
As socio-legal scholars, activists, and practitioners move toward a
common goal of eradicating sources of racial (and other) oppression, we
may move in different directions, and for practical reasons, we may need to
argue from different assumptions. Those differences ought not to divide us.
After acknowledging the strategic value in each of the three positions, we
may be better able to listen to each other, debate differences wisely, and
move toward social change.
